This is an excerpt from my book The Trinity and the Bible, Chapter 18
There is nothing that is logically contradictory about the claims that God is one person or three persons, and they are coherent with the teaching of Scripture. Now, I am not saying we should adopt the phrases “three Gods” in our liturgy and theology—by no means! I am only saying that we do not need to go through logical gymnastics to show why these phrases are impermissible. They are permissible, yet they have the danger of denying the unity of God that is so important to the Bible, so they should not be used willy-nilly. However, by admitting the validity of the phrases in some sense, do we commit ourselves to a different form of mental gymnastics, to show that the claims “God is one God and three Gods” or “God is one individual and three individuals”—or “God is one person” and “God is three persons”—are not logical contradictions? I do not believe we do. A contradiction ensues when we violate the law of non-contradiction, that something is A and Not-A at the same time and in the same way. “A” here stands for any predicate (e.g. James is a man). A contradiction only ensues when contrary (incompatible predicates, “here or there,” of which only one can be true but both may be false) or complementary (opposing predicates, black and not-black, one must be false) predicates are asserted at the exact same time, for a laptop may be blue now and black later, or at home now and at work later. “In the same way” means that to be contradictory, the predicates must have the same sense in both claims: “at home” and “at work” must refer to two different places for the claims “the laptop is at home” and “the laptop is at work” to be contradictory. So, is our doctrine of the Trinity a contradiction? Not clearly.
a. The Compatibility of “one person” and “three persons”
Think about it, are the claims “three persons” and “one person” necessarily incompatible? We are speaking of the same subject; “God” is the subject of both predicate clauses, “is one” and “is three.” And “person” is used in the same sense in both clauses, a subjective, responding, active thing. Yet it is not clear to me that “one” and “three” contradict each other. There are clearly cases where something may be three and one: a triangle has three angles but is one thing, a Trapezoid can be considered one shape or three shapes and yet is one thing. A person with a personality disorder can be one person from his perspective and three from the psychologist’s. Now, none of these are parallels to the Trinity, and we can think of contradictory claims. If we have one and only one apple, there are not three apples, though if we have three apples, we have one apple. Yet with apples, the one is a part of the three or the one is exclusive of the three. Finally, if there is only one person in a room, there are not three persons in the room. None of these are exact parallels to the Trinity, yet logically, they help us elucidate the supposed contradiction. When we speak of “one person” and “three persons,” we are not envisaging a parts-whole relationship, like a trapezoid divided into three. Nor are we considering a modal relationship like the disordered man who is one person now and one person then. However, in each of these cases, we have seen that “one” and “three” are not necessarily exclusive; what makes them exclusive is our understanding of the noun they modify. So, the question we need to ask is this: is it impossible to have one “person” who is three “persons”? That is, does “one person” in the claim “God is one person” mean “one and only one”? I see no reason why this must be the case. There is no logic of “personhood” that says someone who is one person cannot be three. We may respond that we cannot envisage what it would be like to simultaneously enjoy the subjective perception of unity—being one—and being three distinct subjectivities (which is an implication of our definition of “person), yet we cannot say this is impossible even if we cannot imagine it. I cannot imagine what it would be like to be aware of every single thing in the entire universe simultaneously and act on each of them in the same moment, yet this is what God’s governance, knowledge, and omnipresence imply. There is nothing contradictory about these attributes. Thus, there is no reason to think that “one person” means “one and only one.” Moreover, we have the biblical testimony that it does not.
What about “God is three?” Does the claim “God is three” exclude true, personal unity, as in the case of the apples (where “three apples” implies “one apple,” yet that one apple is only one of three not all of them). Though I cannot think of a created analogy where oneness exists on same level as plurality, the sort of limitations that make this impossible in the case of apples or the disordered man do not exist with God. For there to be three apples implies three discreet, physical objects: they cannot be simultaneously discreet apples—with independent skin, stem, flesh, and seeds—and one apple—with one skin, stem, flesh, and seeds. However, “person” in our case does not mean discreet physical object; the ability to act and have subjectivity would suffice. A person can act one way with one arm and another with the other, so a multiplicity of action is not restricted by a unity of person.1 Again, we return to the subjectivity question. In the case of the disordered man, he cannot be this person and that at the same time; there are physical limitations pertaining to the shared body and mind. I think that in this case, even if such limitations were removed, there is a fundamental unity that does not permit both “persons” to present themselves, yet I do not share this intuition concerning God. I see no reason why God could not have one subjectivity that three independent subjectivities within that. The same elements that make “three apples” and “one apple” contradictory do not seem to apply here. For these reasons—and the lack of an argument to the contrary—I see no reason to believe that “one God” and “three Gods” or “one person” and “three persons” are contradictory. “Person” or “God” in these clauses do not appear to be the types of things that excludes unity and plurality on the same level. Moreover, we have the biblical testimony that this is indeed the case, that these are not contradictory claims. Surely we can trust the God whose stability upholds logic and who created all things that these are not mutually exclusive claims.2 On what basis are we to call foul—because we have no adequate analogy? That will not withstand much scrutiny when we stand before the bar at final judgment.
b. Predication and the Names of God
There is another angle from which we need to approach the question of Trinitarian logic before wrapping up this chapter, addressing the relationship between our account of God’s Triune nature and the role of names in grammar and predication. In our discussion above, I teased the need for such an account with the phrases “inclusive” and “exclusive terms” and “non-exhaustive references.” These are ways I am attempting to describe the biblical phenomena concerning the naming of God, phenomena that emerge from the uniquely triune nature of God. Thus, though I find these phenomena in the Scriptures themselves, I have yet to identify a meaningful parallel in the Western / English linguistic context (though perhaps one may be found in another language / linguistic context). I have argued that the Bible doesn’t begin to be Trinitarian in the New Testament—and that the Trinity did not emerge from post-biblical theological reflection—instead, God has revealed himself in Trinitarian parameters throughout Scripture. Thus, we have found no evidence for a monarchy of the Father where “God” refers to “God the Father” unless otherwise clarified. There are certainly moments where “God” does refer exclusively to God the Father, but these moments (in the New Testament) are always qualified: “my Father and your Father, to my God and your God” (John 20:17; cf. John 1:18). This what I will call an exclusive use of a biblical term for God, where “God” is used for one and only one of the persons of the Trinity: {“My God” → The Father (YHWH, Not Son, Not Spirit)}, where “→” indicates reference (that ontological reality which the linguistic sign signifies).3 However, when we turn to the Old Testament—which undoubtedly gave the New Testament authors their basic theological grammar for thinking and speaking about God—we find that God is nearly always used inclusively, without differentiation among the persons of the Godhead (I say nearly to cover myself, but I do not have any specific instances of an exclusive use in mind; an example may, perhaps, be Isaiah 53:4, but this could be a case of non-exhaustive reference, which we will shortly discuss). A term is used inclusively when it refers to the One God without differentiation, and therefore all three persons at once: {“God” → Yahweh (Father, Son, and Spirit)}. For example, in Genesis 1:26-31 we get a glimpse of the intra-Trinitarian participation in creation (see Ch. 6.A.): here, all three persons are implicated in the “God” who speaks, and we are given no qualification to indicate that the term is being used exclusively or even for one person in particular but not exclusively (non-exhaustive reference). This is common for the use of the terms “God” and Yahweh” throughout the Old Testament: we discussed significant instances where these terms are qualified in Chapters 7-9, yet these are the exceptions not the rule. There are other areas were a qualification only becomes evident in light of the New Testament’s progressive revelation, such as the association of “our Father” with God the Father in particular (e.g Deut 32:6; Isa 63:16, 64:8; Jer 31:9; see C. below). However, for the most part, these terms are unqualified. Though it is often assumed that, by default, “God” refers to the Father, there is simply no biblical testimony to this assumption. To the contrary, we have seen that the Bible presents God as one person and three persons: our exegesis has led as towards the assumption that unless qualified, terms such as “God” and “Yahweh,” to which we can add “Lord” (אֲדֹנַי, ’adonay; κυρίος, kurios) and the various permutations of these terms (e.g. YHWH of hosts; YHWH our healer; the Lord YHWH, etc.), refer to the undifferentiated Godhead, the One, true God. This is supported by our discussion of Deuteronomy 6:4, where we identified the terms אֱלֹהִים (‘elohim) and יהוה (YHWH) as referring to the Godhead, yet they did so in different ways: YHWH is God’s covenantal name (cf. Ch. 7.A.), “God” describes YHWH in relation to creation, creator and its authority (cf. Ch. 4), אֱלֹהִימ also indicates YHWH’s plurality. This conclusion is also confirmed by the fact the biblical authors do frequently qualify “God” and “YHWH” to specify the individual persons, e.g., “The Angel YHWH,” “the Spirit YHWH,” “God the Father,” “The Lord Jesus Christ,” etc. That is, in addition to particular phrases that function as exclusive titles (“our Father,” “my Father,” “Jesus,” “Christ,” “The Holy Spirit”), the inclusive terms are sometimes specified to become exclusive terms or instances of non-exhaustive reference, where one person is referred to but not to the exclusion of the others, {“YHWH” → Son (Yahweh, Spirit, Father)}. Thus, given an extensive range of options to specify the persons, and the personal reality of the One God, it follows that the use of YHWH, God, Lord, and similar terms referring to God refer to the undifferentiated Godhead unless accompanied by such qualifications. Thus, the Spirit and Son are not called “God” only here or there—when they are specified—but they are called God along with the Father wherever qualification is absent. Before we draw out the logic of these naming conventions, it is important to consider the New Testament in light of what we have seen in the Old Testament.
It is commonly presumed that unless otherwise qualified, κυρίος (kurios) refers to God the Son and θεός (theos) to God the Father in the New Testament. However, this assumption has serious theological ramifications, for the Spirit is barely alluded to as God (Acts 5:1-6), the Son is called God a mere handful of times (e.g. Rom 9:5), and God the Father is apparently called the only God (1 Tim 1:17). Reading in this way, the few references to Jesus and the Spirit as God almost appear accidental!4 Yet, when read against the Old Testament background, a different picture emerges. The three persons are not occasionally called “God,” but are identified with Yahweh, the One God, one every page of Scripture, occasionally—as necessary—being named by an exclusive use of these regularly inclusive terms or an instance of non-exhaustive reference. Moreover, we have no warrant for this sudden change in the pattern of the biblical grammar for speaking of God—and it is certainly a significant change! If the New Testament authors are truly shaped by the Old Testament—which they undoubtedly are—then we would expect them to follow its grammar concerning the doctrine of God (especially given that the Old Testament is as Trinitarian as the New). If we assume that this is indeed the case, then we find the same pattern: κυρίος (kurios), “Lord,” (being the Greek translation of both יהוה [YHWH] and אֲדֹנַי [Adonay]) and θεός (theos), “God,” are used without qualification inclusively or for non-exhaustive reference, and the biblical authors frequently qualify these terms and other titles throughout the New Testament to refer to the individual persons. Indeed, this is where we find a significant element of progression in the New Testament Trinitarian grammar. The New Testament does not eclipse the inclusive use of θεός and κυρίος, no, but it does enrich our understanding of the One God by favouring the qualification of these terms and the particular titles for the individual persons (and more frequent use of non-exhaustive reference): we are thus given greater insight into the relationship among our Trinitarian God and the economy of their interactions with the creation. We will consider this element of progression in the following section. Before we do so, we will briefly unpack these three categories with regard to Trinitarian names and titles, namely, inclusive terms, exclusive terms, and non-exhaustive reference in logical terms, according to the implications these categories have for Trinitarian predication (which is certainly not the only way they can be considered; thus far, I have tended to describe them merely as grammatical phenomena, of signs as they refer to extra-textual realities, in this case, the complex ontological reality of our Triune God).
What I am calling “inclusive terms” (IT) can be parsed as, for example, {“God” → Yahweh (Father, Son, and Spirit)}. In this analysis, the word on the left side indicates the textual sign, here “God,” the arrow symbol (→) indicates referential function, and the term or phrase on the right indicates an extra-textual referent. For example, in a sentence where “this computer” refers to the computer here on my desk (lets abbreviate it, CD), “This computer is terrible!,” we can parse the reference function of “This computer” as {“This Computer” → CD}. In the sentence, “God created the heavens and the earth” (Gen 1:1), I have argued that “God” here is an inclusive term, thus its reference function can be diagrammed as I have above, {“God” → Yahweh (Father, Son, and Spirit)}. We can unfold this parsing in terms of predication as follows: in the case where an action is performed by “God” used as an IT, then the following four propositions are implied,
1)“Yahweh created the heavens and the earth”
2)“the Father created the heavens and the earth”
3)“the Son created the heavens and the earth”
4) “the Spirit created the Heavens and the earth.”
This is the case so long as in propositions 2-4, “A created” is not taken to mean, “A and A alone created,” as in the claim, “God created the heavens and the earth, therefore Baal did not create the heavens and the earth.” If proposition 2 means “the Father alone created the heavens and the earth,” then this would make propositions 3 and 4 false. Thus, in the case of inclusive terms, the resulting propositions are not exclusive propositions, where “A created” is the equivalent of “A alone created.” Furthermore, in the resulting proposition, “Yahweh” denominates Yahweh as one, yet anything said of the one God Yahweh without qualification is true of each of the persons. According to our discussion thus far, we can conclude that so far as predication is concerned, everything that a particular person does can be attributed to the one God, Yahweh, but everything that is predicated of the one God, Yahweh, is not true of each person. We will offer a diagram to illustrate this momentarily and explain in what way things can be said of Yahweh as one that are not true for each person, but first, having explained the predicational logic of what I am calling an inclusive term, we will turn to exclusive terms and non-exhaustive reference.
In contrast with an IT, an exclusive term (ET) is used for one of the Trinitarian persons apart from the others, thus I have parsed this category as, {“my God” → The Father (Yahweh [Not Son, Not Spirit])}. When an ET is used, that action attributed to God is predictable only of the Unitary person of God and one person, in this case, the Father, not either of the other persons. Thus, if we take the sentence uttered by Jesus, “to your God and my God,” we can analysis the term “my God” in this way. In doing so, we can formulate two propositions from this sentence,
1) God the Father is the God of the Son
2) Yahweh is, as Father, God of the Son.
The first proposition is obvious, but the second may take some unpacking. Because all of the persons are Yahweh, the one God, then anything true of them is true of Yahweh.5 However, predications made from a person to the one person cannot be attributed to Yahweh simpliciter, according to the logic of the ITs treated above, otherwise such predications would also be true of the other two persons. Therefore, we need to qualify either the use of “Yahweh” as the subject of the proposition or add an adverbial determiner, as we have. Because on our ontology explained above, we are talking about God as a personal unity, not merely one of the persons, we cannot modify the subject of the proposition: we are not speaking of God the Father merely but Yahweh, the one true God. Therefore, the phrase “as Father” indicates the way in which the predicate phrase, “God of the Son,” is made of the subject, God. To use another example, it was our Lord Jesus Christ, the divine Son, not God the Father or God the Spirit who was crucified on the Cross. Therefore, if we take Peter’s words, “this Jesus whom you crucified,” and substitute the ET “God the Son,” we can conclude that “God the Son was crucified,” therefore “Yahweh, as God the Son, was crucified,” but not “God the Father was crucified” or “Yahweh was crucified,” the simpliciter proposition which would imply, “God the Son was crucified,” “God the Father was crucified,” and “God the Spirit was crucified.” Now, an ET does not imply the contrary proposition concerning the other persons, which I have indicated by putting “not the Spirit” in square brackets. “Not” in the formula for an ET indicates that the corresponding proposition cannot derived for this or that person, not that the corresponding proposition is false concerning that person. Our final category to parse is the use of non-exhaustive reference.
What I have in mind when I speak of “non-exhaustive reference” (NER) are instances where the biblical text refers primarily to one person of the Trinity yet is not excluding the others. I have parsed this above in this way, {“YHWH” → Son (Yahweh, Spirit, Father)}. In such cases, the logical implications are the same as that of an IT, where what is said of God is true of God as one and each of the persons. However, unlike in the case of an IT, here the text is particularly referring to one person. The logic remains the same for predication: in an instance of NER, any predicate made of the primary referent is true of Yahweh simpliciter and of the other persons. For instance, since no one person of the Trinity is Yahweh himself, but Yahweh is the name of Israel’s true God, and since everything that is true of God simpliciter is true of each of the persons, therefore the Son is Yahweh, the Spirit is Yahweh, and the Father is Yahweh. However, in each case, the predicate “Yahweh” includes the other two persons, so we do not have three “Yahweh”s. No, God is one and he is Yahweh; the God who is Yahweh is three, therefore, each is identified with Yahweh but no one person is the whole of Yahweh. Thus, in every instance where one speaks of “Yahweh,” it is an instance of non-exhaustive reference or an IT. Thus, I can use the name of our God, Yahweh, or the Greek equivalent, Kurios, to name Jesus in particular, but doing so is never exclusive of the other persons.
We could introduce the classical concept of “perichoresis” or inter-penetration at this point: because our one God is the three persons and these three persons are not parts such that God is part Father, part Son, and part Spirit but the Father is entirely God, the Son is entirely God, and the Spirit is entirely God, therefore, when we speak of God, we are speaking of Father, Son, and Spirit: They are present with and in one another without separation or division. When we speak of each person, we are drawn back to the others because they there is no Father without the Son and Spirit, Son without Father and Spirit, and Spirit without Father and Son. This does not mean we cannot speak in particular about the Father, Son, and Spirit, yet in doing so, we are never far from the others, for they are intimately involved in all the other does. There is distinction in the acts of the persons revealed especially in the New Testament, as we will discuss shortly, and therefore a distinction in predicates, yet even these are caught up in the unity of God, for all that is true of one person and not the other is true of God whom they constitute. I am thus using “non-exhaustive reference” to describe the textual and logical phenomena of this ontological reality. Textually, there are instances where “Yahweh” in a particular context refers to the Father, the Son, or the Spirit, yet the doctrine of perichoresis as we have discussed it means that such reference is not to the exclusion of the others. Thus, though something may be attribute to “Yahweh, the Son,” such would also be true of Yahweh the Spirit and Yahweh the Father unless we have reason to believe that it is being used exclusively (as we discussed above under ETs). That is, for this or that reason, biblical authors may want to speak of the Father, Son, or Spirit while not asserting that what they are saying concerns merely the Father, Son, or Spirit (as would be the case with an ET). For example, in John 12:38-40, John quotes from Isaiah 53 and Isaiah 6, where Yahweh is exalted upon his throne; in 12:41, he says that the prophet said what he said because he saw “his glory,” where “his” refers to Jesus. John is making a point about Jesus’ ministry, so he applies Isaiah 6 to Jesus: it was Jesus’ glory which Isaiah saw. However, in doing so, he is not saying that this glory was not that of the Father or the Spirit: nothing in the context of Isaiah 6 makes it clear that this is God the Son, and John’s use of this passage does not require this to be the case. Instead, he refers specifically to the Son without excluding the others, {“YHWH” → Son (Yahweh, Spirit, Father)}. We can summarise these three categories of divine naming with the figure below, which visualises the logic involved, not ontology (i.e. by illustrating the Father, Son, and Spirit as individual circles within a larger circle, I am not intimating that they are parts of a whole).
In this diagram, I have laid out each possible type of signifier discussed above spatially, represented with a letter from A – G. Any signifier that is equivalent to A is logically equivalent to {“God” → Yahweh (Father, Son, and Spirit)}, that is, an IT. A signifier equivalent to A may also be the logically equivalent but semantically different NER, such that {“YHWH” → Son (Yahweh, Spirit, Father)}. Thus, in a proposition where the subject term, e.g. Yahweh, is an IT or NER, we can place the predicate in the space designated A in the diagram. Everything that is located at A is simultaneously within the circles representing God as One (the whole) and each person. Therefore, a predicate located at A is true (the spatial diagram representing what can be predicated as true of the subjects it represents) of Yahweh, Father, Son, and Spirit.6 For example, if we place the predicate “omniscient” at A, then the following propositions are true:
1) Yahweh is omniscient.
2) The Father is omniscient.
3) The Son is omniscient.
4) The Spirit is omniscient.
As will become clear, only what can be placed in space A is said of Yahweh simpliciter (without a “as Father,” “as Son,” or “as the Spirit” qualification). The areas marked C–D represent partial ETs or NERs, such that what is said is true of two persons but not the other. Let us suppose that only the Father and Spirit did an act A1 (representing any possible action performed by Father and Spirit but not the Son). We could locate A1 at Point D (Presuming the Top and Left inner circles represent the Father and Spirit, respectively), and the following propositions would be true:
1) The Father did A1.
2) The Spirit did A1.
3) Yahweh as Father and Spirit did A1.
The area marked by E–G represents full ETs. If we place a predicate in one of these areas, two propositions result. Christ was crucified, so we can put “was crucified” in area F, and the following two propositions would result:
1) The Son was crucified.
2) Yahweh as the Son was crucified.
There is another set of predicates that don’t fit into this diagram but can be superimposed as the prime of each area, e.g. A’, B’, etc. In these cases, something is true because of the persons, etc. For example, we could put the predicate “Trinity” or “three” at A’ because God is Triune or threefold because of the three Persons. It should be observed that a visual representation such as this is inadequate, for in reality, there is nothing said of the One God that is not said of the persons, so the space between the individuals and the whole implies an impossible reality, a predicate true of God without being true of or because of the Divine persons (even “one” is true of each of them by virtue of their identity as YHWH, the one God). However, we could draw a similar diagram for predications concerning a human person, providing an analogy for our discussion (though as we have qualified, a human has parts, whereas the Father, Son, and Spirit are not parts of the One God). I can say “I am typing,” yet this predicate is not true of every part of me. Instead, it is true because of my fingers, thus, “I am typing with my hands” prevents extending the proposition to every other part of the body. “I” simpliciter would be area “A” with every part of a person moving outward. Concluding our discussion of the grammar and logic of the Trinitarian unity-in-plurality, it is clear that we can follow the biblical testimony in proclaiming one God who is three, one person who is three persons, without abandoning rationality in the process—though the biblical account of rationality we adopt, where God is ground and measure of reason and he has spoken clearly in his word, will not be acceptable to many who do not themselves believe.7 This is the biblical teaching we have seen. One person, Yahweh, the True God, is three persons, the Father, Son, and Spirit. It is important to observe what this does to our perception of the Trinitarian “tension” in Scripture. The Bible upholds these claims without perceiving them to be in tension, yet it intentionally rules out misinterpretations of the relationship between God’s oneness and threeness. Thus, I am led to the conclusion that the “tension” in the “Trinitarian tension” we have discussed in this book is the result of something we bring to the table. In a polytheistic context, threeness seems to exclude oneness. In a philosophical context of absolute monotheism, oneness seems to exclude threeness. Thus, being biblical about the Trinity is not about living with tension but seeing how the biblical teaching removes the tension. The Bible’s doctrine of the Trinity is that Yahweh the One God is three, each of whom are Yahweh and God. We have followed the Bible in interpreting these as “individual” terms, referring to things, and in identifying them as things of the sort that can be called a “person.” There is no need in this doctrine of the Trinity to provide a metaphysic resolving a tension in the doctrine, for when we follow the Bible’s lead, we have no reason to believe that a “person” is the sort of thing that cannot be (at least in the case of God) one and three simultaneously. Thus, the extensive testimony to God’s plurality and unity found in both Testaments constitutes the Bible’s doctrine of the Trinity. The New Testament authors didn’t need to resolve the tension between these claims because, within the biblical frame of reference, there is no tension.
- There is extensive literature concerning the bizarre scenarios where a person is capable of contradictory actions or intentions, usually resulting from some sort of disruption to the physical brain. Cf. Iain McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World, New expanded edition. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019). [↩]
- On God upholding logic, see Poythress, Logic. [↩]
- “Reference” also encompasses inter-textual reference, but in this section, I use “reference” solely for extra linguistic reference (“that sofa, over there”). [↩]
- Eg. Walter Dulière argues that it is the ambiguity of κυρίος as a Christological or secular title and its use for “YHWH” that led the early church to deify Christ. Walter L Dulière, “Theos–Dieu et Adonai—Kurios,” Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 21, no. 3 (1969): 193–203. [↩]
- Traditional Christology has offered an alternate interpretation of this terminology, but I find that account unpersuasive. This is the topic of my PhD thesis, “Rightly Defining the Son of God.” [↩]
- Vern Poythress uses Venn Diagram’s similarly in his book Logic to spatially represent set theory. Cf. Poythress, Logic, 256–265. [↩]
- Cf. Cornelius Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub Co., 1969); Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, ed. K. Scott Oliphint, 4th ed. (Phillipsburg: P & R Pub, 2008); Frame, The Doctrine of the Knowledge. [↩]
